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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
OscAR W. MoYLE and ) 
· MAY P. MoYLE, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. ) 
SALT LAKE_ CITY, a. municipal 
corpora hon, 
Defendant arnd Appellant. 
Case No. 6328 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
This action was brought by Oscar W. Moyle and May 
P. Moyle, his wife, against Salt Lake City to re-cover dam-
ages alleged to have been suffered by them on a0count 
of the city depriving them of their water. 
The backround of the matters involved in which this 
litigation grows out of are as follows: 
In 1848 there was constructed what is known as the 
Big Cottonwood :Tanner Ditch and the waters were 
diverted. through this ditch from the Big Cottonwood 
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Canyon Creek for use on the lands in and around 62nd 
South Street and the ·bench lands east of Murray City. 
The ditch was divided into several branches, all of which 
is fully illustrated 1by Exhibit I, which is a map prepared 
by Mr. Towler, one ·of the City Engineers. The Big Co{ 
tonwood 'Tanner Ditch diverts the water from the· :f3ig 
Cottonwood Creek just south of where ·6,2nd .South !Street 
intersects Big Cottonwood Canyon Creek. 
The water right developed through the Big Cotton-
wood Tanner Ditch was divided into 1795 units or shares, 
each unit or share representing one acre of water right. 
There was a corporation organized, known and desig-
nated as the Big Cottonwood ·Tanner Ditch Company 
and the owners of the water rights in the Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch transferred to the ·corporation their water 
rights and received a share of stock for each unit of 
water right conveyed to the corporation. 8ome few of 
the owners of the rights in the ditch failed to turn their 
entire holdings in the Tanner Ditch to the col'lporation 
with the r~sult that the major portion ·Of the water rights 
of the Big :Cottonwood Tanner Ditch is owned and con-
trolled by the Big Cottonwood 'Tanner Ditch •Company. 
The plaintiffs claimed to own 22 3/4 shares of water 
rights in the Big 'Cottonwood Tanner Ditch that was not 
conveyed to the Big Cottonwood 'Tanner Ditch Company 
and this lawsuit involves that particular water right. 
After the corporation was formed and on the 22nd 
day of January, 1920, a contract was entered into be-
tween the Big Cottonwood Tanner Dit10h Company and 
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Salt Lake City, a copy of which contract was introduced 
as a part of Exhibit "A", and by the terms .of that con-
tract the Big- ·Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company grant-
ed, conveyed and transferred to the ~City the right to 
have, take and use perpetually from the Big Cottonwood 
Creek in Salt Lake County all of the portions of the 
water of said 'Creek to which the Big Cottonwood Tan-:-
ner Ditch Company is or at any time may be entitled 
e:x!cept 2.591 second feet of water during the months of 
April, ~Iay, June, July, August and September, and 1.436 
second feet of water during the months of October, No:.. 
verhber, December, January, February and March, of 
each year, the City to provide suitable water mains over 
designated territory for the delivery of culinary water, 
the City to furnish and deliver to the Company water 
suitable for irrigation purposes during the months of 
April, May and June of each year a quantity of water 
equal to that quantity to which the Company is entitled 
to take from the Big Cottonwood Creek less the culinary 
water, and during the month o£ July, 30 second feet, ~rid 
during the month of August, 28 second feet, and during 
the month of Septemher, 26 second feet, and during the 
first fifteen days of October, 15 second feet. 
That in pursuance of said agreement the City con-
structed the water mains and pro,ceeded to deliver the 
eulinary ·water in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment and made application (Exhibit "C") to the !State 
Engineer for permission to change the point of diversion 
of the waters of Big ·Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company 
from the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch to the mouth of 
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Big Cottonwood Canyon and into the city's conduit, the 
location of which is· fully shown by Exhibit I, which ap-
plication was granted by the State Engineer on the 
3rd day of .September, 1920. 
The city constructed a pumping plant and a rpip~­
line for the purpose of pumping the irrigation water 
f~om the gravity flow ·canal up to the intake of the Big 
'Cottonwood ·Tanner Ditch, which pumping plant was 
used for the first time in 19·26. ('Tr. 269, Abs. 139) Dur-
ing the years 1927, 1928 and 1929 there was no foreign 
water pumped into the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch. 
In the year 1930 there w~s diverted into the head of the 
Tanner Ditch during April, May and June Cottonwood 
Creek water. During July, August and September a 
small part of the water was canal water that was mixed. 
('Tr. '270, Abs. 140) 'In the year 1931 during April, May 
and June the water was Cottonwood Creek water. Dur-
ing July and a part of August and five days in Septem-
ber canal water was added to the creek water; also some 
canal water added during the month .of October. In 1932 
during April, May, June and July the water in the Big 
Cottonwood ·Tanner Ditch was diverted from the Big 
Cottonwood Creek with no Lake water added. From the 
4th day of August and until the 15th day of October 
there was some canal water added. (Tr. 270, Abs. 140) 
In 1933 during April, May and June and until July 
26th the water was from the .Big Cottonwood Creek that 
was diverted in the Big ~Cottonwood Tanner Ditch. From 
July 2~6th to August 18th a portion of the water was 
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<mnal water. Frmn August 26th until the 1'5th day of 
October the water was clear canyon water. 
In 1934 during April, ~fny, June and July and until 
August 27th the_water was Big Cottonwood ~Creek water. 
From August 27th until October 15th, excepting five 
days in September, the water was partly from the canal. 
(Tr. 271, Abs. 141) 
In 1935 during April, :Jiay, June and July and until 
August lOth the water was clear water from Big Cotton-
wood 'Creek. From August lOth until September 2oth 
there was a portion of .canal water and from the 20th ·Of 
September to October 15th water ~was from Big Cotton-
wood Creek. (Tr. 271, Abs. 141} 
In 1936, during April, May, June and July and until 
August lOth the water was Big Cottonwood Creek water. 
From August 11th to October 15th there was canal water 
in the Tanner Ditch. 
In 1937 in April, May, June and July and until 
August 23rd, the water was clear water at the head of 
the Tanner Ditch. 
In 1938 during April, May and June and until the 
28th day of July clear water was furnished to the Tan-
ner Ditch. 
In 1939 during April, May and June and until July 
lOth the water was clear in the ·Tanner Ditch. From July 
lOth until October 15th there rwas Lake water added. 
On June 28, 1926, there wa1s a case eommenced by 
8alt Lake City in the District Court of Salt Lake County 
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entitled Slalt Lake City vs. Osca,r W. Moyle a;nd May P. 
Moyle, his wife, case No. 38604, plaintiff's exhibit "A'', 
in whieh case it was asked by Salt Lake City that it be 
allowed to take the water of the defendants, Oscar W. 
Moyle and May P. Moyle, and in lieu thereof furnish to 
them canal waters for irrigation and Big Cottonwood 
water in the piJpeline for culinary use. Thereafter the 
defendants, Oscar W. Moyle and May P. Moyle, filed a 
demurrer and motion to strike. On the 2nd day of July, 
1926, the court made the following order: That Salt 
Lake City is authorized to take all the water of Big 
Cottonwood Creek flowing into the Big Cottonwood 1Tan-
ner Ditch and return to the Big 'Cottonwood Tanner 
Ditch ~water suitable for irrigation in lieu of the water 
taken and that as soon as possible Salt Lake City should 
in water pipes make available for the defendants, Oscar 
W. Moyle and May P. Moyle, for domestic and culinary 
purposes sufficient ~creek water from Big Cottonwood 
Creek. 
Nothing further was done in the case until the 2nd 
day of Octoiber, 19·37, when a notice was ~served calling 
up the demurrer and motion to strike, which thereafter 
was regularly heard by the court and the demurrer sus-
tained. On the 7th day of January, 1938, the following 
o.rder was made in case No. 38604, "Exhibit A'': 
''The court having sustained the demurrer 
imposed 'by the defendants in the above entitled 
case and the attorneys for plaintiff having stated 
in open court that they did not desire to amend 
their co·mplaint but chose to stand on their com-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
plaint without amendment, it,is therefore ordered 
that the above entitled case be and the same is 
hereby dismissed. 
''Done in ·open cou:M this 7.th day of January, 
A. D. 1938. 
P. C. EvANS, Judge." 
On the 17th day of April, 1939, the Moyles present-
ed their claim to the Board of Commissioners of Salt 
Lake City, 'Claiming that the plaintiffs had been dam-
aged in the sum of $4,150.00, plaintiff's Exhihit "B". 
On July 20, 19·39, plaintiffs commenced the suit which 
resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Oscar 
W. Moyle and May P. Moyle, and against Salt Lake City, 
from whieh judgment this appeal is prosecuted. 
II. 
Appellant relies on all errors assigned and will 
restate the errors as they are argued in this brief and 
therefore deem it unnecessary to reprint the assignments 
of error collectively. 
III. 
The particular questions involved herein are sub-
stantially as follows : 
A. Does the complaint state sufficient facts to con-
stitute an action against Salt Lake City~ 
B. Can the plaintiffs recover a judgment for dam-
~ges in any sum other than nominal damages rwithout 
proving that damages have been suffered~ 
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C. ~Can the plaintiffs waive a tort and sue on an 
implied contraoc.t and recover the reasonable rental value 
of a water right where the \Yater has never ·been reduced 
to poss,ession of the plaintiffs~ 
D. May you prove damages for the reasonable 
rental value of property by proving that the plaintiff 
believes that the property co·uld have ·been sold for some 
stated amount and that the proceeds from the sale could 
be loaned at a rate of interest that would appear satis-
factory to the plaintiffs and then take the yield from that 
multiplication or computation as the reasonable rental 
value~ 
E. May the plaintiffs prove a reasonble rental value 
by having a witness testify that the water from the aver-
age run-off over a period of eight years would amount to 
a definite number of gallons and that multiplied by the 
price per gallon charged for culinary use by Salt Lake 
City and the result divided by 22 3/4 would give the rea-
sonable rental value per share per year for the water 
rights claimed ~by Mr. Moyle~ 
F. May the court take judicial knowledge of the 
fact that the water flowing from Big Cottonwood Canyon 
Creek untreated is fit f.or culinary use~ 
G. May the plaintiffs, Moyles, use the culinary wa-
ter through the pipes and all the irrigation water they 
need to maintain the growing of trees, shrubs and grass 
on their premises and still recover the full amount ot 
the rental value of their water right~ 
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H. May the plaintiffs recover the reasonable rental 
value of the water right for the years that the evidence 
conclusi,yely sho"·s there was no interference with plain-
tiffs' water right by Salt Lake City1 
I. ~lay a. judgment stand which is not supported 
by the pleadings and the pleadings not supported ·by the 
evidence1 May the judgment stand where it attempts 
to order delivery of an incofiporeal right~ May a judg-
ment order the return of ·possession of corporeal property 
when the evidence shows that the city has not the prop-
erty in its possession and the evidence shows that the 
property is not novY in existence, that is at least under 
anyone's control~ 
IV. 
BRIEF OF ARGUMENT. 
Salt Lake City's general dmnurrer that plaintiffs' 
complaint did not state facts sufficient to ·eonstitute a 
cause of action should have been sustained. (Assignm·ent 
of Error No. 1, Abs. 164) 
The plaintiffs in their complaint allege (.A!bs. 1, 2 
& 3) that the defendant is a municipal corporation; that 
the plaintiffs own 22 3/4 shares ·Of -vvater right in the Big 
Cottonwood stream and entitled to the use thereof 
through the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch and that the 
water right is appurtenant to plaintiffs' land situated in 
Sec. 15, T. 2 IS:., R. 1 E., and that Salt Lake City on the 
23rd day of July, 19'26, procured an order of the District 
Court for the immediate possession of the water so owned 
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by the plaintiffs and that Salt Lake City on the 23rd day 
of July, 1926, entered into the possession of said water 
so ·Owned ·by Oscar \V. Moyle and May P. Moyle and has 
held possession continuously thereof from that day until 
the present time, and that on January 7, 1938, Salt Lake 
City without notice to the plaintiff procured an order of 
the court dismissing the a~etion in which the order of pos-
session had :been entered and thereby terminating the 
order of possession, and notwithstanding such order of 
dismissal .Salt Lake City has continued to use such water 
·belonging to the plaintiffs and has failed and refused to 
deliver any part thereof to the plaintiffs. That the rea-
sonable value of the use and possession of such water 
so withheld and possessed by the city from the plaintiffs 
from the time of the taking of possession to the time of 
filing the ·complaint is the sum of $4,150.00 and that the 
plaintiffs on the 17th day of Alpril, 1939, presented their 
claim to the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City 
in writing verified;· that by reason of all of whieh the 
plaintiffs were damaged in the sum of $4,150.00 and the 
plaintiffs pray judgment in that sum and for the return 
to the plaintiffs of the use and possession of the water 
and for their costs. There is no allegation in the com-
plaint of any damages suS'tained or suffered by the plain-
tiffs. 
Nor is there any allegation that the respondents 
would or ·could have put the water to a ·beneficial use. 
We must bear in mind the peculiar difference in a water 
right and the other property rights of which we deal 
with. If a man owns land or chattels he may use them 
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or not as he sees fit and his failing to use them does not 
give the right to someone else to use them. This is not 
true with a property right which is the right to use water 
from a public stream. "\Vith a water right a man must 
beneficially use it or failing to do so he cannot ibe heard 
to complain of someone else making a beneficial use of 
the water. It has always :been the rule of law in Utah 
and other arid regions that the measure of anyone's wa-
ter right is "beneficial use shall be the basis, the 
measure and the limit of all rights to the use of w~ter 
in this State.'' 
In the case of Falkenberg, et aL, vs. Neff, 72 Utah 
258, at page 265, the court rupproves this rule: 
''At such times as a prior appropriator is not 
using the water under his appropriation for a 
beneficial purpose such waters are considered and 
treated under the doctrine of appropriations as 
unappropriated public waters and for such periods 
of time are su:bject to ruppropriation and use ~y 
others.'' 
Hence the eomplaint must state that the plaintiff would 
have put the water to a beneficial use during the period 
in question except for the interference by the defendant. 
If the theory of the complaint is to recover damages up.-: 
der the allegations therein contained plaintiffs could not 
recover more than nominal damages. Anna C. Rohwer 
vs. Abram Chadwick, 7 Utah 382. 
If the theory of the complaint is to waive the tort 
and sue on an implied contract, then t?e ·complaint fails, 
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a-s it is nowhere stated in the complaint that the waters 
'taken were ever in the possession of the plaintiff or ever 
became their personal property, and the rule of law 
which permits one to waive the tort and sue on an im-
plied •contract is where personal property is involved. 
This situation was so eompletely and briefly stated in 
the .case of Parks Cwnal & Mining Oompawy vs. fV. W. 
Hoyt, 57 California at page 44. I feel at liberty to set 
out the opinion of the court in full as follows: 
·''For the purposes of this decision, it may be 
admitted that water acquired .by appropriation 
(1to he sold to miners' and others), by means of a 
ditch leading from a natural stream, becomes, 
after it has passed into the ditch, the personal 
property of the appropriator. Further, it may 
'be admitted, that if water be taken or diverted 
from the ditch, without the consent of the 3lp-
propriator, he may waive the tort and bring an 
action for the value of the water taken. N everthe-
less, although such appropriator may be entitled 
to the flow of the stream undiminished, the water 
in the stream above his ditch is not his personal 
property. The stream as yet flows in its natural 
course~a part of the realty. The appropriator 
certainly does not become the owner of the very 
!body of the water until he has acquired •control 
of it in conduits or reservoirs, created by art, or 
applied to the purpose of leading or storing wa-
ter by artificial means. It follows, that he ·cannot 
maintain an action for the value of the water-
as for personal property •sold and delivered -
against one who, without his consent, has diverted 
the stream above the mouth of his ditch. 
"The evidence tended to prove that plaintiff 
was owner of a. ditch dug for the purpose of con-
du'0ting water from the Cossumnes River to Squaw 
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Hollow Creek, and also of another ditch leading 
from Squaw Hollow Creek, at a point below the 
Cossumnes ditch. Defendant diverted walter 
from the Squaw Hollow Greek at a place between 
the two ditches. There was evidence that, 'at 
the times the water was taken by the defendant 
there was not suffitcJ.ent water in Squaw Hollow 
Creek to fill the 'Squaw Hollow Creek ditch.' But 
there was no evidence of the quantity of water 
then running from the Cossumnes ditch into 
Squaw Hollow Creek, or that any was flowing 
through that ditch. For aught that appears, all 
the water diverted by defendant was water nat-
urally flowing in .Squaw Hollow Creek. If this 
was the ease, it is clear, from what has been said 
above, that an action for the value of the water, 
as personal property, cannot be maintained. The 
natural bed of Squaw Hollow Creek acquired the 
·character of an artificial conduit to the extent, 
and only to the extent, that the waters of the Cos-
sumnes River flowed through it. The water 
:brought to Squaw Hollow Creek by the Cossumnes 
River ditch alone, if any water can be sn con-
sidered, can be -considered the personal property 
of the plaintiff. 
"The defendant moved for a nonsuit, on the 
ground, amongst others, that 'the testimony ut-
terly fails to show any contract, agreement, or 
promise by defendant to pay plaintiff for the al-
leged water.' If plaintiff relies upon the promise 
to pay reasonable value, which the law implies 
from the wrongful taking of personal property-
the tort being waived-there is a complete failure 
to prove the facts from which the promise is im-
plied (and therefore the promise itself), since the 
evidence fails to show that any personal property 
was taken. 
"
1The view we have adopted renders it unnec-
essary to decide other questions presented. We 
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may suggest, however, first, the answer does not 
distinctly deny that the plaintiff was organized 
.as an asso-ciation under the laws of Pennsylvania; 
and second, the complaint fails to allege that the 
laws of Pennsylvania gave to plaintiff the power 
to sue, or any o·ther corporate power. 
''Judgment and order affirmed. 
'''Morrison, C. J., and Ross, J., ·concurred." 
The above case was cited with approval in the case of 
Salt Lake City vs. Utah & Salt La:ke Cawal Company, 
and ·others, reported in 24 Utah at page 249. At page 
266 the court used this language: ,,, Albove his headgates, 
however, the water in the stream or lake is not his per-
s·onal property and he does not ·become the owner of it 
until he acquires ·control of it in artifi·cial ditches or 
reservoirs;" ·citing Parks Camal & Mining Co. v. W. W. 
Hoyt, 57 Cal. 44. 
If the theory of the complaint is to secure redress 
under Se{Ytions 104..!61-10 and 11 of the Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 19'33, then it again fails to state facts sufficient 
to constitute a ·cause of action. The first section cited 
provides the authority f.or occupation of property during 
condemnation proceedings and the terms and conditions 
under whi·ch order of occupa·ti·on may be granted and pro-
vides 'for the filing of a bond in the penal sum not less 
than double the value of the premises and the damages 
which will ensue from the condemnation in case the 
property is condemned and ''to pay all damages arising 
from •Occupation .before judgment in case the premises 
are not condemned.'' If it is the contention of the plain-
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tifis that their action is based on the condemnation stat· 
ute, they must allege damages in order to state a cause 
of action. This the comi?laint fails to do and as pointed 
out hereafter in this brief the plain tiffs' counsel in .open 
court disclaimed any damages, which clearly indicates 
what the interpretation of the complaint is to be, that it 
does not allege damages suffered hy the plaintiffs. 
The majority of the cases take the view in the a•bsenoo 
of statute imposing liability that as the state or sub-
division thereof or a corporation on which the power of 
eminent domain has been conferred in commencing a 
condemnation proceeding is in the exercise of a legal 
right and since every pers·on owns property subject to 
the exercise of such right or privilege and the public 
officers have to exercise discretion in deciding on the 
use ·Of property for public purposes, the damages which 
he suffers by reason of proceedings subsequently aban-
doned does not give rise to an action on his part but is 
damnum a•bseque injuria. 
D. & R. G. W. Co. vs. Mills, 
147 Pac. -6-81; Ann. ~Cas. 191,6-,E, 985; 
Ford vs. Parks Comrs., 
126 N. W. 1:030; Ann. Cas. 191'2-C, 940; 
S'idelinker vs. Yorkshire Water Co., 
105 Atl. 122, 2 A. L. R. 327 ; 
State, ex rel. St. Louis vs. Beck, 
63 S. W. 2nd 814, 9'2 A. L. R. 373. 
·The above rule we think does not apply in respect 
to actual damages or loss suffered by the property owner 
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hJit actual darn~ges must be alleged and proved and the 
l9ss ·()r injury cannot be based upon spe.culative or con-
t.ipgent .events. Annotation 31, ·A. L. R. 364. 
The complidnt in paragraph 3 states: "That in an 
a:ction then pending in this court wherein the defendant 
herein was plaintiff and these complaining plaintiffs were 
defendants ·said Salt Lake ·City as such plaintiff pro~ 
cured an order of this court to he entered on the 23rd 
da.y of July, 1926, for the immediate 'possession of said 
water so owned 'by these plaintiffs to be delivered to said 
Salt Lake City. On the said 23rd day of July, 19·26, said 
Salt Lake City entered into the possession o'f said water 
so owned by these plaintiffs.'' 
We think plaintiffs should have alleged that the city 
procured a valid order for the possession of plaintiffs' 
water, for if a void order or just any kind of an order 
it would have no bearing on 'the case. We invite the 
court's attention to plaintiffs' Exhibit "A", the court 
files in the case about whi,ch the plaintiffs are complain-
ing. 'The complaint was filed on June 28, 1926. 
In paragraph 8 :of the con1plaint there is set out what 
purports to be a resolution passed by the Board of Com-
missioners of Salt Lake City on June 9, 1926. On June 
28, 1926, a notice was served and filed setting the date 
for hearing on the order for the 3rd day of July, 1926. 
From that situation it clearly shows the court did not 
. have jurisdiction. 'This jurisdictional defect is sought 
to be corrected by an amendment to the complaint filed 
on July 12, 192-6. This we think could not be done. 
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Section 15-7-4, R.evised .Statutes of Utah, 1933, pt·ol 
ddes how the city n1ay acquire water ;by eondeninatioti 
proceedings, which is to the effect that the city must pass 
~ resolution or ordinance and publi~h the same~ de-clar-
ing it to be deemed necessary for the public good that 
the city bring condemnation proceedings. Then the city 
must wait thirty days to see if any taxpayer of the city 
protests the bringing of the condemnation proceedings 
~nd, if one-:-third or more of the taxpayers pro,test, th~ 
matter must be put to an election before the city can 
pr·oceed with its condemnation proceedings. ·This matter 
was before the Supreme Court of the 1State o.f Utah in 
case of Tremonton vs. Johnson, and.others, reported in 
49 Utah, page 307. On page 310, the court. states the 
law to be as follows : 
"The .general rule is that where the statute 
prescribed the procedure or steps to be taken by 
a municipal corporation in exercising the right 
of eminent domain, the procedure prescribed. hy 
the statute bec.omes a matter o.f substance and 
must be strictly followed by. the condemnor as 
against the owner of the property sought to be 
condemned. It is further held that where the 
statute prescribe certain steps to be taken before 
initiating condemnation proceedings, such steps 
are jurisdictional and may not be disregarded.'~ 
On page 311, the court quotes with a1pproval from 
Whitehead vs. Denver: s~ Pae' 913 
"It is held that where a statute requires cer-
tain things to be done hy a munioipality before 
initiating condemnation proceedings, things re-
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quired to be done ·Bonstitute a condition precedent 
to the rights to institu.te the proceedings and must 
be .alleged and proved.'' 
We think the amendment to the complaint was of 
no consequence. Lewis vs. Fox, 54 Pac. 823. Quoting 
from page 826 : 
''':It is said by respondents, however, that 'the 
deprivation of the thirty inches of water from the 
artesian wells, and ouster from the same reason 
of the foreclosure and sale and sheriff's deed 
under the Donovan mortgage, is pleaded in their 
supplemental cross complaint.' But this does not 
aid rt:he original cross complaint. The cause of 
action must exist when the action-commenced by 
the cross eomplaint___.)was brought. If a suit be 
brought upon a promissory note before it !becomes 
due, the com~laint would not be aided by a sup-
plemental ,eomplaint filed after it became due, al-
leging its maturity at a date subsequent to the 
·commencement of the action.'' 
In the case of Keeler vs. Parks, 130 Pac. 111, at page 
113, the eourt said : 
''The m·otion for a judgment dismissing the 
action upon the pleadings was properly sustained. 
The pleadings ·show that the action was premature. 
A state of facts that had not ripened into a cause 
of action when the suit is commenced cannot be 
supplemented by a class of facts that came into 
being later so as to make a cause of action." 
The court never having had jurisdiction in the mat-
ter could not make an order and any order the court 
made was a nullity. In the case of State vs. Ba.tes, 22 
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Utah 65, 61 Pa·c. 905, quoting from the opinion at page 
906: 
·• A void judgment is really no judgn1ent. It 
leaYes the parties litig·ant in the same position 
they were in before the trial. It leaves them in 
exactly the sam~ position as if no trial had taken 
place. Such a judgment confers authority upon 
no one to enf.orce it. 'A void judgment,' says Mr. 
Black, •is in reality no judgment at all. It is a 
mere nullity. It is attended hy none of the eon-
sequences of a valid adjudication, nor is it entitled 
to the respect accorded to one. It can neither 
affect, impair, nor create rights. As to the per-
s·on against whom it professes to he rendered, it 
binds him in no degree whatever ; it has no effeet 
as a lien upon his property; it does not raise an 
estoppel against him. As to the ·person in whose 
favor it professes to be, it places him in no better 
position than he occupied hefore; it gives him 
no new right, but an attempt to enforce it will 
place him in peril. As to third persons, it cam 
neither be a source of title, nor an impediment in 
the way of enforcing their claims. It is not nec-
essary to take any steps to have it reversed, 
vacated, or set aside. But, whenever it is br·ought 
up against a party, he may assail its pretensions 
and show its worthle·ssness. It is supported by no 
presumptions, and may he impeached in any ac-
tion, direct or collateral.'' 
In the case of Minnesota Thrasher Man~t/acturing 
Oo. vs. L. 'Heureua;, 118 N. W. 565, at page 5·66, the court 
says: 
"Now a void judgment is in reality no judg-
ment at all. It is a mere nullity. It is attended 
by none of the consequences ·of a. valid judgment, 
nor is it entitled to respect accorded to one~ · It 
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can neither aff~ct, impair, nor create rights. As 
to the person against whom it proposes to be 
rendered, it binds him in no degree whatever." 
.·This last pr.oposition urged as a grounds for the com-
plaint not stating a cause of action is equally appurten-
ant to the assignmeruts of error Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15 and 17. 
Assignment of Error No. 17 is that the court erred 
in admitting in evidence plaintiffs' Exhibit "A" . 
. AssiGNMENTs OF 'ERROR Nos. 2, 3 AND 4--ABSTRACT 165. 
Assignment of Err•or No. 2 challenges the correct-
ness of Finding of Fact No. 2 wherein the court found 
that the plaintiffs were the owners of 22.75 shares of 
water right in the Big Cottonwood stream. Assignment 
of Error No. 3 ·challenges finding of fact No. 3 wher·ein 
the ·court found that on the 23rd day of July, 1926, Salt 
Lake City procured an order of court for the immediate 
'possession of the plaintiff's water, and in accordance 
with the order entered into the pos·s.ession of the said 
water and has ·continuously had and held the possession 
thereof from the 23rd day of July until date of trial. 
Assig.nment of Error No. 4 challenges the finding of fact 
N·o. 4 wherein the court finds that Salt Lake City has 
continued to and does now use water belonging to the 
plaintiffs and has failed and refused to deliver any part 
thereof to the plaintiffs or either of them. The above 
three assignments of error will .be argued together. 
There is no evidence in the cas.e that the M·oyles or 
either of them are the owne'rs of 22 3/4 shares of water 
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right in the Big Cottonwood streafu.· Mrs. Oscar W. 
Moyle testified (abstract 26, trans•cript 58) that h~ owned 
22 3/4 shares of the total flow of the Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch Company, which I think the witness meant 
to say, 22 3/4 shares o'f the total flow of the Big Cotton-
wood 'Tanner Ditch. Now here in his testimony does he 
testify that he owned 22 3/4shares of water right in the 
Big Cottonwood stream. In plaintiffs' complaint, para-. 
graph 2, the plaintiff.s claim to be the owners of 2·2 3/4 
shares of water right in the Big Cottonwood stream itnd 
entitled to the use thereof through the Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch. We submit that thisfinding is erroneous 
and absolutely contrary to the evidence. It may he urged 
that the defendant, >Salt Lake City, knew or ought to have 
known that the plaintiffs meant to say that they owned 
22 3/4 shares of water right in the Big Cottonwood Tan-
ner Ditch. This, however, I think would ibe un'fair to the 
City, and eondones poor pleading to the prejudice of the 
defendant. 
If the plaintiffs, the Moyles, had alleged the facts 
in their complaint in a,.ccordance with the testiimony giv.en 
by Mr. Moyle, the City would then have had the op-
portunity to have denied the fact as alleged and to have. 
put in issue the ·extent of the right which Mr. Moyle testi:-, 
fied that he owned in the Big Cottonwood 'Tanner·Ditch, 
but with the allegation of .the Complaint as it is, this 
issue could not be raised. 
In finding of fact No. 3 where the court find~ that 
the City entered into. possession of the water of ·plain..:' 
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tiffs, the Moyles, and had continued to hold possession 
thereof from .the 23rd day of July, 1926, until date of 
trial, is contrary to all the evidence in the case. In the 
first place, there is no evidence that the City ever had' 
possession of any water owned 'by Mr. Moyle. The find-
ing of fact indicates that the ·court believed that Moyle 
had .actual possession of the ·corpus of the water and that 
the City took the water from his posse·ssion, and there 
is not one scintilla. .of evidence in the re-cord to that effect. 
The evidence does show that at some periods during the 
tim·e in questlion the City diverted the Big Cottonwood 
Creek stream of water from its natural channel at the 
mouth of Big Cottonwood 1Canyon, and placed it in the 
Salt Lake City conduit; but the evidence conclusively 
shows ·that that was £or only a. short period of each of 
the year·s in question, and that it oceurred the first time 
in 1926; that in 1927, 19•28, and 1929 there was no inter-
ference at any tin1e of the year by Salt Lake City with 
any water right of Oscar W. Moyle and May P. Moyle. 
The exa•ct dates and length of time that the City inter-
fered with the natural flow of the Big Cottonwood Creek 
are specified in Mr. 'Towler's testimony (Abs. 139, 140, 
141; Tr. 269, 270, 271, 272) and the evidence shows that 
Mr. Moyle used the water as freely during the period 
in controversy as at any other time. 
The testimony of Mr. Horace T. Godfrey ('Tr. 219; 
,&bs: 126) and George F . .Smith ('Tr. 259; Abs. 136} who 
were the water master·s of the Big Cottonwood Tanner 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
Ditch duriiJlg the time in question each testified that as 
water masters they issued a card to each of the water 
users, sho"Wing the time to take the water and the num-
ber of hours they would be permitted to use it, and these 
.~ eards were delivered to Mr. Oscar W. Moyle the same 
a·s other water users of the Big Cottonwood Tanner 
Ditch, all of which is more fully explained and shown by 
E·xhibits 4, 5, 6, and 7 (Testimony of Mr. Godfrey, Abs. 
127-132 inclusive). 
There is no evidence in the case that Salt Lake City 
did any act or acts pursuant to any order of any court. 
There is no evidence in the case, in fact the evidence is 
to the contrary, that no order of a ·court was ever served 
on the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company, or on 
McDonald, the eourt commissioner of the Big Cotton-
wood ·Canyon Creek, directing either of them to deliver 
the water under their jurisdiction to 18alt Lake City, nor 
any evidence that either of them were directed by any 
court to deliver allly water belonging to Os,car W. Moyle 
and his "Wife to Salt Lake Ci·ty. There is no evidence 
that Oscar W. Moyle and May P. Moyle were ever en-
joined or restrained from using any water. 
Findings .of Fact N·os. 2, 3 and 4 are wholly unsup-
ported by the evidence and are contrary to the undis-
puted evidenee which shows that for the larger portion 
of each year, and during the entire time ·Of four of the 
years the water ran in the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch 
undistui'tbed and undimim.ished by Salt Lake City. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
A~s~GNl\fENT OF ERROR No. 5___,ABSTRACT 166. 
The oourt in its finding of fact No. 5 found that the 
reasona1ble value of the use and possession of the water 
is the sum o'f $4,150.00, and from the time of filing the 
complaint to the time of judgment the sum of $350.00, 
which, together with interest at the rate of 67o makes a 
total damage to the plaintiffs in the sum of $4,7·69.75. 
This finding is contrary to the evidence and is not sup-
ported by the evidence. There isn't one sdntilla of evi-
dence in the record that Oscar W. Moyle arnd May P. 
Moyle or either of them suffer·ed any damage, and their 
attorney in open court ( A'bs. 148) disclaimed any dam-
ages :Bor any dimunition of water after 1'926. 
How could the court then find .any substantial dam-
ages had ;been suffered by them, and give to the Moyles 
a judgment as the court did~ How could the Moyles 
have a water right and he deprived of it without suffer-
ing damages~ The fact is that they either had no water 
right beeause they had not been putting water to bene-
ficial use, or if they had been using the water beneficially, 
then they eontinued to re1eeive the water and use it, or 
they would have 'bet!n damaged. 
There is no .competent testimony in the re·cord that 
$15.00 per year per share is a reasonable rental value. 
Mr. Moyle testified (Abs. 37 and 38): 
'' Q. What in your judgment would be the 
V[tlue of the water represented by the '22 3/4 
shares not in the corporation and which the city 
obtained its order for possession on July 23, 1926, 
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what would be the reasonable value for the use 
of that water during that timeol 
"Since the year 192G there has been very 
s1nall quantities of Big Cottonwood Creek Water 
available to people in that community. The only 
water that is availa:ble to them for culinary pur-
poses comes to them through the pipes belonging 
to Salt Lake City. 
'·' Q. And you know what the \ralue of that 
water coming through the pipes of Salt Lake is 
in that vicinity ? 
''A. Yes. 
''A. I would say $15.00 per share per year 
is as near as I cam figure its value." 
In my humble opinion that would not furnish any 
basis upon \Yhich the court ·could find that $15.00 per 
share per year was a reasonable rental value, as the evi-
dence shows that the \Yater right which :Hr. Moyle claims 
is a fractional part of the North ·branch of the Big Cot-
tonwood Tanner Ditch, which he receives by way of a 
water turn about once a \Yeek, and that the water as it 
comes down naturally from the Big Cottonwood Creek, 
and that the water as it cnmes down fr·om Big Cotton-
wood Creek is unfit for culinary use without being first 
treated, and that kind of a water right has no relation 
to the value of culinary water piped to a residence, treat-
ed so as to be fit for culinary use and in a pressure pipe 
so it ·can be used in conjunction with modern household 
conveniences. 
The other witness who testified for the Moyles as to 
rl'utal value was Mr. Wyler, a civil engineer, who testi-
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fied that he took the total flow for the entire year for 
which the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch would be en-
titled to, and then to·ok the amount of that which Mr. 
Moyle wou1d be entitled to and took the average of that 
quantity for the past eight year·s and calculated the num-
ber of gallons of water that would be the average yield 
and then divided that quantity in half and multiplied 
that result by the price per gallon which Salt Lake City 
charges for water delivered through its water mains in 
the City, and dividing that sum by 22 3/4 shares gave 
the figure at which he said was the reasonable rental 
value per share per year. That isn't any evidence of the 
reasonable rental value or of any value of any vmter. 
·There was nothing in his testimony that couldn't have 
been calculated by the court ·Or by any Sixth grade pupil 
who -could multiply, sn:bstract and divide ordinary 
arithmetic problems. There isn't any evidence ~n the 
record that Mr. Moyle had a ·0ontinuous flow right. The 
evidence is to the contrary. 
There isn't any evidence nor any pleading that Mr. 
Moyle could have sold his water, which he claimed the 
right to receive, for culinary use, and no evidence as to 
what the cost would be to reduce it to posses·sion, treat 
and ·chlorinate it, pipe it to prospective ·customers, and 
collect the rents. All of it is too speculative and imagina-
tive to be given credit by a court as to the reasonable 
rental value of a water right. 
All we have said concerning assignment of error No. 
5 applies equally to assignment of error No. 6, which 
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assigns as error finding of fact No. 7, wherein the court 
found that the Moyles had been damaged in the sum of 
$4,769.75. There is no evidenc-e that the plaintiffs or 
either of them suffered any damage, and as has been 
pointed out, they, through their attorney, in open court, 
disclaimed any right to recover any damages, claiming 
that th~y were not seeking damages and did not attempt 
to allege or prove any damage>S, and this assignment of 
error is also supported by the ·eases cited in support of 
assignment of error No. 1. 
AssiGNMENT OF ERROR No. 6----ABsTRACT 167. 
The court erred in its finding of fact No. 7 wherein 
the court finds that plaintiffs have been damaged in the 
sum of $4,769.75. This is ·coJlltrary to the evidence and to 
the claim of plaintiffs, who stated that they were not 
claiming damages. Bearing in mind that the plaintiffs 
in their complaint are seeking a judgment eovering a 
period from July 23, 19'26 to date of filing complaint, and 
the only claim they make is for an equal amount each 
year for that period, that is, reasonable rental value for 
their water right; and the evidence conclusively show's 
that in the years '27, '28 and '29 there was no interfer-
ence with their water right, but notwithstanding that th~ 
court gives them judgment as prayed for covering the 
entire period from July 23, 1926 to date of trial. 
What would be the prope·r measure for the reason-
able rental value .of the water right~ Assuming, but not 
admitting, that the plaintiffs were entitled to a reason-
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able rental V1alue, it surely would· not ·beth~ rental'value 
for the highest duty the water .could be put to, but :could 
only 1be the reasona.ble rental value for the use to which 
the water had been put to, which was for irrigation pur-
poses ; and the plaintiffs did not introduce any testimony 
pretending to prove the reasonable rental value of a wa-
ter right used for irrigating trees and shru'hs. The court 
did not take into consideration any beneficial use that the 
plaintiffs received from the water furnished them through 
the culinary pipes or the clear ~canyon water which was 
permitted to run to them part of every year, and all of 
some years, nor did the court consider the reduction in 
loss, if any, which the plaintiff sustained, by recognition 
of the lake water whieh was pumped into the Big Cotton-
wood Tanner Ditch during a part of some of the years. 
Mr. Moyle'·s testimony is that he used culinary water 
from the pipe which was supplied by Salt Lake City since 
the year 1921, the year the pipes were placed in front 
of his place. Hence the plaintiffs could not have had any 
water rights of any kind during the non-irrigation sea-
son. He had not been aipply~ing any water to bene.ficial 
use after 1921 for a culinary purpose. He testified that 
the water was piped into his home and also into his cor-
ral and that he watered his livestock and lawns from the 
culinary pipeline. 
1The evidence shows by all of the witnesses that Mr. 
Moyle took his regular water turn in accordance .with 
the ~cards issued him iby the water masters, saving and 
excepting .. two.' .,years when . water master Godfrey was 
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directed not to time the 22 3/4 shares of water right to 
Mr. Moyle. 
The order of the court, plaintiffs' Exhibit "A", of 
which the ~Ioyles complained, provided among other 
things, "'ordered that as soon as possible plaintiffs shall 
in ''ater pipes furnish to or make available for defend-
ants for domestic and culinary purposes sufficient creek 
water from Big Cottonwood Creek," thereby sho·wing 
that the -city did not get an order for the taking of all 
of ~Ioyles' "-ater and under Section 104-61-11, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, the ·court in making up its find-
ings should take into consideration the value of the por-
tion not sought to be condemned and how much benefit 
the Moyles ·would derive by the delivery of culinary wa-
ter in the pipes to the Moyle's premises. This provision 
of the statute the court ignored in its findings and in 
making up the judgment for damages. 
By the complaint of Salt Lake City 1n case No. 
38604, naming as defendants Oscar W. Moyle and May 
P. Moyle, if the city .sought to take by the law of 
eminent domain water in the Big Cottonwood Creek and 
substitute therefor Utah Lake water. (Par. 10, Exhibit 
"A"). The complaint was filed June 28, 1926, and a 
general and special demurrer was filed by the defend-:-
ants on July 16, 1926. On the 23rd ·of July, 1926., the 
court granted its order authorizing the city to take 
possession of the said water of Big Cottonwood Creek 
flowing in the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch and to turn 
into the· Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch other water ·Suit.:. 
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ablefor irrigation in lieu and in place of the Big Cot. 
tonwood Creek water s'o taken therefrom. (See File 
38604, Exhibit "A"). 
The above referred to order was never reviewed 
or otherwise assailed by the defendants except that de. 
fendants ·called up the demurrer above mentioned for 
argument some eleven years later on October 8, 1937, 
and the court sustained the demurrer and thereafter on 
January 7, 1938, ordered the complaint of plaintiff in 
said case No. 38604 to he dismissed. The city thereupon 
abandoned is action in case No. 38604 and did not further 
seek to condemn said water. 
In the event that the plaintiff claims his right in the 
present action under the law of eminent domain his 
damages must be recovered in the acti1on, case No. 38604, 
either f.or a taking in the event of eondemnation or f.or 
damages arising from the occupation or possession of the 
property before judgment in case the premises are not 
condemned in accordance with Section 104-61-11, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933. 
In the event, however, that plaintiff is suing in tort 
or has waived the tort and is suing on an implied con-
tract, then no suit would lie against Salt Lake Ci•ty unless 
a claim is filed a·s is required by ·the pr,ovisions of 
Section 15-7-76, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. Fur-
ther, said claim must he filed in the manner and within 
the time required by the provisions of said ,section. 
Apparently plaintiff's theory was that he wa·s suing 
either in tort or implied' 'contract because he made no 
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attempt to obtain damages in the case, No. 38604, above 
referred to, and he filed a claim in an attempt to· comply 
with the provisions of Section 15-7-76 above. However, 
the claim referred to in said section of the statute must 
be filed within one ye-ar after the accrual of the cause 
of action. If the plaintiff i.s suing in tort or for an 
implied contract, his cause of action accrued when the 
order of dismissal of the action was entered. There-
fore, the claim under said statute must have been filed 
within one year from January 7, 1938. The claim was 
filed on April17, 1939, one year and three months after 
the accrual of the action. 
Now another point of view. If the order of pos-
session in case No. 38604 was void, then no action can 
be maintained £or any of the year.s from July 23, 1926, 
to April17, 1938, for rthe reason that each of those years 
would constitute a separate transaction and no claim was 
filed for any alleged damage pursuant to said section 
15-7-76, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, until April 
of 1939. 
The right to institute an action in this class of case.s 
against a municipal corporation is purely statutory. It 
did not exist at common law and therefore the condition 
precedent fixed by the said Section 15-7-76 must be com .. 
plied with, or the action fails. 
Hurley v. Bingharm, 
63 Utah 589, 228 Pac. 213. 
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· ·' It is ·within ·the ··power of the legislature to impose 
such ~conditions upon the right to .sue cities and towns, 
which are merely arms of the state government, as in 
its judgment may seem wise and proper, and the condi-
tions which are thus imposed are conditions precedent 
and cannot be ignored either by the claimants or by the 
eourt · ' 
Berger v. Salt Lake City, ~Utah 403, at 408, 191 Pac. ~~g3 
.Ci. 
AssiGNMENT OF ERROR No. 8-ABSTRACT 169. 
This assignment of error challenges finding of fact 
No. 9 which finds that the plaintiff,s, the Moyles, had 
not abandoned their water right nor any part thereof. 
This finding of fa:ct is not supported by the evidence 
and is contrary to the evidence. 
Mr. Moyle testified (Abs. 43. Tr. 90) : 
"Q. What you used it £or principally was to 
irrigate the trees and shrubs and bushes and 
things growing on that tract of land~ 
"A. Principally, yes. I had a little garden 
there for some years.'' 
He further testified (Tr. 84; Abs. 39) that he had built 
his new house in the year 1923 and provided it with 
culinary water piped for the upstairs and downstairs 
and .conne-cted to the main line-s that were put in in front 
of his place by the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch and 
Salt Lake City; and that he has ever ·since used culinary 
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water, from that source for his ·house, sprinkling his 
lawn, and watering· his horses, and ·there is no evidence 
in the record which proves or tends ·to prove any other 
use, so that giving Moyle full credit for all of his 
li;estimony :he only had a water right for ·irrigation during 
the irrigation season from the Big Cottonwood Tanner 
Ditch, and that his culinary water was received through 
the water mains laid by Salt Lake City. 
AssiGNMENT OF ERROR No. 9. 
This assignment of error challenges finding of fact 
No. 9, which is to the effect that the water involved 
in this case is the same a:s that decreed to Oscar W. 
Moyle in the case of Progress Company vs. Salt Lake 
City, et al., 53 Utah 5·56, 173 P:ac. 705. This finding is con-
trary to the facts as pointed out in the argument to as-
signment of error No. 8, that the evidence shows the 
extent of the water right which Mr. Moyle claims and 
that is the only water right which Mr. Moyle could claim; 
and there is no evidence in the Teeord as to what the water 
right was in the case of Progress Company vs. Salt Lake 
Ci~ty. This finding of fact is not responsive to any issue 
in the case. There was no allegation in plaintiffs' com-
plaint regarding the water right whFch Mr. Moyle owned 
in the Progress C ompwny vs. Salt Lake City, and as this 
court po~inted out in the case of Shurtliff~ et al., vs. Salt 
Lake City, 96 Ut. 21, that evidence without pleadings was 
of no coni;;equence. 
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There is no purpose in finding No. 9. Whether the 
water right which Mr. Moyle owns is the same as that 
water right de·creed to him in the Pflogre.ss case is 
wholly immaterial. The only question before the court 
is, what is Mr. Moyle's water right~ And this court has 
repeatedly held, and the state statute declared the law 
to be ·that beneficial use is the measure of the right of a 
water right in this state. 
This finding, if permitted to stand, is prejudicial to 
the City, in this, that it purports to find a water right 
or a fact against Salt Lake City in accordance with a 
historical document, without the matter having been 
placed in issue to determine whether it is or is not a 
fact, and makes the judgment and decree ambiguous in 
that any officer of the law attempting to enforce the 
judgment would have to peruse the records of the Third 
District Court to determine for himself what this decree 
purported to declare the wa:ter rights of Mr. Moyle to be. 
AssiGNMENT OF ERROR No. 10. 
This assignment of error challenges the correctness 
of the conclusi•on of law which the ·Court drew conclud-
ing that the plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment in 
the sum of $4,7·69.75,and for the return to said plaintiffs 
of the possession and use of said wateT and the whole 
thereof. What we have said concerning the assign-
ments of error No. 1 to 6 inclusive and 8 and 9 applies 
with equal force to assignment of error No. 10 insofar 
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.as the rendition of the judgment in the sum of $4,769.75 
is concerned. 
Here again the court seems to have assumed that 
the ~Ioyles had possession of the corpus of the water 
and that Salt Lake City took the per.sonal property, the 
very corpus of the "~ater from the possession of the 
~Ioyles. There is no evidence in the case from which 
the ·court could so conclude. All of the evidence shows 
conclusively that the City did not have possession of 
Moyle's water and that ~Ioyle did not have possession of 
the corpus of the water. 
How could the court enter a conclusion of law con-
cluding that the plaintiffs were entitled to the return 
of the possession and use of their water~ There is no 
evidence that Mr. Moyle or his wife had any water. The 
evidence is that they claim to have a water right, ·or that 
is to say, a right to use water, and they claim that the 
City interfered with their right of use; and the only 
legal thing the court could do would be by way of enjoin-
ing the City from interfering with plaintiffs' right to use 
water, if such issue had been put in issue by the plead-
ings, which it was not, and hence was not before the 
court. 
The court apparently proceeded on the theory of 
replevin, directing the return of personal property. 
There is no evidence in the record that the City has 
taken any water from Mr. Moyle and stored it in any 
particular place where the court could order a return of 
the water, .and hence such a ·Conclusion is wholly er-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
roneous and prejudicial to the defendant Salt Lake City; 
to decree that the City do s:omething which the evidence 
show.s it could not do; it has not the power, not having 
the possession of any personal property belonging to the 
Moyle·s. 
AssiGNMENTS OF ERROR No. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 
AND 16-ABSTRACT 171-176 INCLUSIVE. 
The·se assignments of error are as follows: 
11. 
The court erred in entering its judgment herein in 
fav-or of the plaintiffs and against the appellant f:oT the 
reason that the great preponderance of the evidence 
established all material facts in favor of the defendant 
and contrary to the plaintiffs and that under the law 
defendant was entitled to a judgment in its favor. (Tr. 
27; Ahs. 13). 
12. 
The court erred in entering its judgment, to the 
effect that the plaintiffs have and recover from the 
defendant Salt Lake City 1the sum of $4,7,69.75 and shall 
have and recover of and from the said defendant the 
use and possession of the water from the Big Cotton-
wood stream described as 22% shares ·of water right in 
the Big Cottonwood stream and the appellant specifies 
that there is no evidence in the record from which the 
court could conclude. to find or enter its judgment that 
the plaintiffs were ~ntitled to that amount of money. 
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And appellant specifies that there is no evidence in the 
reoord.to indicate that Salt Lake City has possession of 
the plaintiff's water and therefore could not be subject 
to a judgment to return possession of something of which 
it has not the possession and appellant specifies that· the 
evidence conclusively shows that any water rights Mr. 
~loyle has or claims are water rights in the Big Cotton-
wood Tanner Ditch and not in the Big Cottonwood 
stream and there is no evidence in the recor-d which 
shows that plaintiffs, Osear W. Moyle and wife, are the 
owners of 22% shares of water right in the Big Cotton-
wood .stream. (Tr. 27; Abs. 13). 
13. 
The Court erred in enter-ing its judgment and 
decree, wherein it adjudged and decreed that the plain-
tiffs' water rights were the same water as that decreed 
to Oscar \V. M·oyle, in the .case of Progress Company 
vs. Salt Lake City, and in paragraph 7 of the decree 
in the case of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Compam;y 
vs. Vilncent Slvurtliff, et al., and appellant specifies that 
there is no evidence in the record to p:r:ove that the water 
rights claimed by Mr. Moyle at the date of this hearing 
were the .same as the water rights decreed to him in the 
case mentioned. In fact, the evidence is all to the con-
trary. (Tr. 28; Abs. 14). 
14 . 
. The court erred in entering its decree in the form 
and manner in which it is drawn in this respect, that 
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the decree or judgment other than the amount therein 
specified is .so indefinite and uncertain, ambiguous and 
meaningless that it should be held for naught, and the 
appellant specifies that the decree could not he enforced 
as no officer of the law could tell where to find or how 
much water 22}4, shaTes of water right in the Big Cotton-
wood stream in Salt Lake Couruty, Utah, is. No other court 
could determine whether or not this judgment was being 
violated or c-omplied with, and appellant specifies that 
no law enforcing officer could take the judgment and 
determine whether or not the water right litigated in 
this case is the same as the water right adjudicated in 
some other case without going beyond the judgment .of 
this case and taking the testimony to determine what 
this judgment might mean. ( Tr. 28, 29; Abs. 1'5). 
15. 
The trial court erred in overruling and denying 
defendant's motion for a new trial: 
1. Excessive damages having been g1ven. 
2. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the deci-
sion and judgment, and ·the judgment being against law, 
there · being no competent evidence in the record t() 
justify or support the Findings ·of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law or Judgment. ( Tr. 31 ; Abs. 15). 
16. 
T·he trial court erred in overruling and denying 
defendant's motion for a new trial: 
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(a) For the reason that there is no evidence 
in the record which proves or tends to prove that 
the -plaintiff·s or either of then1 suffered any dam-
ages or were injured in any n1aterial way by 
any ,conduct of commission or omission of Salt 
Lake City. 
(b) The evidence shows that without contra-
diction the plaintiffs have abandoned any water 
right or right to use ,water from Big Cottonwood 
Creek or the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch dur-
ing the \\inter season and notwithstanding this 
evidence the court granted judgment to plaintiffs 
for an interference with plaintiffs' water rights 
during the entire year. · 
(c) The evidence conclusively shows that the 
plaintiffs used water from the Big Cottonwood 
.: .. " Tanner Ditch and all the water they desired to 
use without any hindrance or interference of the 
defendant Salt Lake City. 
(d) Appellant specifies that there is no evi-
dence in the record from which the court could 
conclude or find that Salt Lake City was under 
any obligation to deliver any water to the plain-
tiffs or either :of them. 
(e) And appellant specifies that the court 
·erroneously gave judgment in the sum of $350.00 
for damages from the time of filing the complaint 
to the time of judgment, and there is no evidence 
proved or claim that the plaintiffs or either of 
them suffered any damages during the period of 
time and there is no evidence in the record that 
the plaintiffs or either of them filed any claim 
with Salt Lake City claiming damages for that 
period of time, and appellant specifies that there 
is no competent evidence from which the court 
could enter its judgment to the effect that the 
plaintiffs or either of them had .suffered damages 
in the sum of $4,769.7:5. The evidence conclusively 
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show.s that the plaintiffs did not suffer any dam-
age. 
(f) And the evidence shows that the plain-
tiffs ·Claimed and re-ceived damages for twelve 
years, when in law they could not receive judg-
ment for damages received beyond four years 
from the date of filing their complaint. 
(g) And appellant specifies that the court 
gave its judgment for an all year round use of 
water, when the evidence conclusively shows that 
the plaintiffs have abandoned any water right or 
the right to the use of the water from Big Cot-
tonwood Tanner Ditch during the non-irrigation 
season. 
(h) Appellant ·Specifies that the decision is 
against law in this, that the evidence shows that 
plaintiffs were benefited and received a larger 
amount of water, both culinary and irrigation 
water, than they could have received had it not 
been for the exchange agreement with Salt Lake 
City. 
(i) And the appellant .specifies that the court 
could not grant judgment giving the plaintiffs the 
right to recover from Salt Lake City the pos-
session uf a water right from the Big Cottonwood 
stream described as 223,4 shares, as a water right 
is not a subject of replevin and the water is gone 
and could not he replevied, and it is contrary to 
law for the court to is.sue an injunction or adjudi-
cate an injunction without it being based upon the 
pleadings and evidence to support the pleadings. 
(j) And appellant specifies that the court 
erred in failing to take into consideration the duty 
of the plaintiffs to mitigate their dmnage, if any 
they sustained, and the court failed to take into 
·Consideration the fact that the evidence showed 
that in a portion of the time involved in this liti-
gation the water flowed down the Big Cottonwood 
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Tanner Ditc.h uninterfered .with in any way, shape 
or form by Salt Lake City. (Tr. 31 to :~4; Abs. 
15). 
The arg·uments and authorities cited in support of 
assignments of error Xo. 1 to 10 inclusiYe, are equally 
pertinent to assignn1ents of error 11 to 16 inclusive, and 
we submit them on the arguments already made, with 
this addition. 
How could the decree which the court ·entered be 
enforced~ No officer or court could tell where to find or 
how much water :223;! shares of water right in the Big 
Cottonwood stream in Salt Lake County, Utah is. What 
amount of water is that~ How would the court deter-
mine when the judgment or decree in the instant case 
had been complied with~ How eould anyone read the 
decree in the instant case and know whether or not it was 
complied with or violated? How ·Could the court deter-
mine what a reasonable rental value for 22% shares :of 
water right in the Big Cottonwood stream would be 
worth~ 
Lost Creek Irrigation Co. vs. Ren, et al., 
26 Utah 485. 
The evidence not only shows that the plaintiffs suf-
fered no damage.s, but on the contrary, proves that the 
Moyles were materially benefitted by the additional 
water that was made available to them by re~son of 
the City furnishing more water under the contract of 
exchange agreement than would have been without the 
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contract, and the compliance with it on the part of Salt 
Lake City. 
The testimony of Richard C. Towler (Abs. 142 to 
144 inclusive) and exhibit 9 shows the quantity of water 
that Moyle would have received under his claim right 
and the mnount of water whi·ch he actually did receive. 
This testimony is uncontradicted, and demonstrates that 
the Moy les were benefitted and not damaged. 
The court erred in not granting defendant a new 
trial. (As-signments of Error Nos. 15 and 16). The 
evidence establishes the following facts : 
1. That from 1926 to date of trial the water has been 
delivered to the Moyles in the same manner that it was 
in aU previous years. It is interesting to note that in 
paragraph 4 of plaintiffs' eomplaint they allege that 
notwithstanding the order of dismissal Salt Lake City 
has •continued to and does now use such water belonging 
to the plaintiffs and the evidence shows that the water 
had been handled in the same manner from the inception 
of the exchange agreement up to the date of the trial, 
which demonstrates that the ·Conduct of the parti·es was 
not governed by the order :of the ·Court. 
2. The evidence shows that the Big Cottonwood Tan-
ner Ditch Company was decreed the right to distribute 
the water of the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch to the 
stockholders as well as to the owners of water rights 
who were not in the corporation. (Def·endant's exhibit 
2, files in case No. 14230.) (Abs. 87). 
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,3. The evidence shows that the Big Cottonwo·od Tan-
ne;r Ditch .Company was never directed by the court or 
~()ne else to cease delivering water ·to Oscar W. Moyle. 
4 .. The evidence (witness Towler) is conclusive that 
the water d€livered to :Moyle during the period of 1926 
until 1930 was clear mountain water ·coming from the 
Big Cottonwood ~Canyon Creek and thereafter for only a 
short period of time during irrigation season was there 
any Lake warter co-mingled with the walter of the Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch. 
5. The evidence dem:onstrated that during the period 
in question Moyle actually used his full term as allotted 
to him by the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company, 
including the 22% shares in question. (Witnes.ses God-
frey and Smith). 
6. It i.s uncontradicted that there was an abundance 
of clear chlorinated water piped to Mr. Moyle's prop-
erty and three large openings from the eity mains con-
necting with the Moyle property and that he had used 
all the clear water he desired through these connections 
which were unmetered and under a pressure of approxi-
mately thirty pounds. 
7. The evidence shows that the court taking judicial 
knowledge of the character of the water flowing in Big 
Cottonwood Creek was improper and contrary to the 
evidence in the case and demonstrates that the court was 
biased and prejudiced against the defendant Salt Lake 
City. 
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8. The evidence shows that the users of water under 
the Big Oottonwood Tanner Ditch have not used the 
winter water for eulinary or domestic purposes since 
the pipes were put in ther·e by Salt Lake City about 
the year 1921. 
9. There is no evidence in the record which prove·s 
or tends to prove any need ·or use for water on the Moyle 
lands during the winter months f:or any purpose other 
than culinary. 
10. The ·evidence eon-elusively shows that the Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company has furnished more 
water for il"l'igation and growing 'Plants, trees and ~rops 
than would have been received had it not been for the 
exchange agreement. (Witness T:owler). 
11. The evidence shows that the plaintiffs, Oscar W. 
Moyle and wife, have not been damaged in .any way, have 
suffered no monetary loss by reason of any conduct of 
Salt Lake City, but on the eontr.ary the evidence shows 
they have been benefitted by having received more water 
for culinary, domestic and irrigati:on purposes than they 
could or would have received under their elaimed rights 
had it not been for the actions of Salt Lake City and 
the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company. 
T·he plaintiff, Mr. Moyle, filed ·a protest in the State 
Engineer's ,office, dated June 20, 1938, and while he was 
on the witness stand he was asked if the following from 
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from the protest : 
"3. That protestant has at present use and 
prospective use for all of his said Big Gottonwo:od 
water for culinary, residential and .stock watering 
purposes, and has no use for the Utah Lake or 
Jordan water proposed to be substituted for it. 
' '4. That pr01testan t 's land in H·ollada y in Salt 
La·ke County, upon which he does now and has for 
many years used his said water from Big Cot-
tonwood Creek, is not and never has been or will 
be used for farming purposes, and is valuable for 
and suitable and has been used only for residen-
tial purposes and not for farming, and· is and has 
been for many years entirely platted to be used 
for residences. 
"5. That protestant's said land is valuable 
Dnly for residential purposes and that all of pro-
testant'.s said water from Big Cottonwood Creek 
is necessary for culinary and residential purpo-ses 
upon his said land.'' 
This clearly shows that plaintiffs have no water 
rights for Winter use other than for culinary and 
domestic purposes, which they have received through 
the water pipes furnished by Salt Lake City. If the 
plaintiff is seeking to recover damages .by reason of 
the order of the court entered on June 23, 1926, he dearly 
is not ·entitled to such, as the court order was entirely 
void, and if it .should he determined that the ~court order 
w'as not void then we are met by this situation. The 
court fixed the price and terms for the temporary pos-
session of the water and until the further order of the 
court, and if the court had fixed a price f.or the water 
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for temporary purposes in a sum that was considered by 
the plaintiff Salt Lake City excessive the city would 
not be compelled to take the water at the prioe fixed. 
In ·other words, it is the universal rule that the con-
demnor does not have to accept the measure or amount 
of damages for property which it seeks to condemn if it 
deems the price ·excessive, but the -court having fixed 
the price or terms upon which it might take the Moyle 
water, the city had the right to rely thereon so long as 
it paid the price fixed by the court and there is no evi-
dence or claim by the plaintiffs in this case that they 
are seeking damages or compensation because of the city 
having failed to .comply with the order of the court. 121 
A. L. R. page 1. 
Referring to the case of Big Cottonwood Tanner 
Ditch Company vs. Shurtleff, et al., 49 Utah at page 578, 
the court lays down this proposition: 
' 'It has been elementary doctrine in the arid 
region that no one is entitled to a greater quantity 
of water for any particular use or purpose than 
is reas-onably necessary to supply the needs of 
the claimant for the specified purposes. This is 
. true regardless of the quantity that has been 
used for such purpo~se and the length of time it 
may hav·e been us-ed.'' 
.And again on pag·e 582 the court states : 
"Nor can they claim water for culinary, 
domestic and livestock purposes .and then devote 
it or any considerable part of it to irrigating pur-
poses; that they may not do that by law, as I have 
pointed .out, is well settled." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
47 
\Yherein were the Moyles damaged? They had all 
the water they could ust• and more for culinary, domestie 
and irrigation purposes. The plaintiffs prayed for 
$4,150.00 but the court felt they had not prayed for 
sufficient, possibly feeling that ~lr. :Moyle was bashful 
and did not like to ask for all the money that he was 
entitled to and gave him judgment for $350.00 covering 
a period of time of whieh there was no allegation cov-
ering the same or any pray~r for relief covering the 
period from the filing of the complaint to the date of 
trial. A novel situation in a lawsuit. No elaim was 
filed with Salt Lake City seeking eompensation for the 
period of time from the lith day of April, 1939, to date 
of trial. 
If the court was granting compensation for the rea-
sonab'Ie rental value for the use ·of the property during 
the period it is alleged to have been held by the order 
of the eourt, on what theory of law then does the court 
conclude that the plaintiffs were entitled to· damages 
or rent from the time the case was dismissed on the 
7th day of January, 1938, to date of trial~ That period 
of time surely could not have been for rental value of 
property held by an order ;of the court. 
The evidenee in this ease shows that early in 1920 
Salt Lake City made applieation to the State Engineer to 
Gpange the point of diversion from the Tanner Ditch 
Company to the eity's eonduit at the mouth of Big Cot-
tonwood Canyon and to give the Tanner Diteh water 
from the Ea.st Jordan canal. This applieation was ad-
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vertised and the application granted on September 3, 
1920. It is .our contention· that all those who wished 
to obje-ct to the arrangement and who ·Could be affected 
by it were compelled to file their protests before the 
State Engineer and if they were dissatisfied, to take their 
appeal to the court. It is the only way that Salt Lake 
City, who wanted a change of place of diversion of 
waters, could compel the matter to be adjudicated before 
the expenditure was incurred or commenced; otherwise, 
an a.ppropriator could simply refrain from taking any 
action, permit a large expenditure and then bring an 
injunction suit to enjoin the change of place of diversion 
and there by greatly damage and retard progress. 
The evidence of Mr. Moyle demonstrates that he 
knew of the exchange agreement and knew that the ex-
change of the company's water for other water would 
necessarily mean Lake water in the Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch part ;o.f the time, and he sat supinely by 
never protesting the application for the change of the 
point of diversion of the waters of the Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditc-h. 
I think Section 100-3-3 of the Revised Statutes .of 
Utah give.s the State Engineer original jurisdiction for 
the determination of the right to change the point of 
div·er.sion or use and that anyone dissatisfied with the 
State Engineer's de-cision must accept it or appeal to the 
District Court. This makes an orderly procedure, gives 
everybody an opportunity to be heard and the right to 
their day in court and do·es not permit anyone to be what 
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we sometimes refer to as a ''dog in a manger.'' In other 
words, an applicant for a change of diversion may know 
in advance whether he has a right to make the change 
and can rely upon the venture ·Of large expenditures i~ 
effectuating the proposed change of diversion. 
AssiGNMENT OF ERROR No. 17. 
The court erred in admitting in evidence plaintiff's 
Exhibit "A". (Abs. 176). Exhibit "A'' consists of the 
files in the ·Case .of Salt Lake City vs. Oscar W. Moyl~ 
and May P. Moyle, filed June 28, 1926, wherein a certain 
order was made on J u1y 23, 1926. 
The first paragraph of the order is to the .effect that 
Salt Lake City is a municipal corporation and enjoys 
the right of eminent domain and that the use Salt Lake 
City would make of Big Cottonwood water is a more 
necessary public use than the use to which the water is 
now applied. 
Paragraph 2, ''That said Salt Lake City, plaintiff 
is hereby authorized to take all the water of Big Cotton-
wood Cre·ek now flowing in Big Cottonwood T·anner Ditch 
and to turn into said Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch 
other water suitable for irrigation in lieu and place of 
the Big Cottonwood Creek water so taken therefrom 
by plaintiff, and it is further ordered that as •soon as 
po·s.sible plaintiff shall in water pipes furnish to or make 
available for defendant for domestic and culinary pur-
poses sufficient .cre·ek water from Big Cottonwood Creek. 
Dated July 23, 1926. '' 
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The only purpose of introducing Exhibit "A" would 
he if a valid order was ther·ein made upon which Os·car 
W. Moyle and May P. Moyle were prejudiced and could 
he the basis of a cause of action. We objected to this 
as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, which objec-
tion was overruled. ( Abs. 25) This order above set out 
is absolutely void. A judgment is void when it affirma-
tively appears from the inspection of the judgment roll 
that any one of three following jurisdictional elements are 
absent : first, jurisdiction ov·er the person; second, jur-
isdiction of the .subject matter; and third, judicial power 
to render the particular judgment. Winona Oil Co. vs. 
Barnes, 200 Pac. 981. 
A void judgment 1-s one which shows on face of 
record a want of jurisdiction in court assuming to 
render judgment, which want of jurisdiction may be 
either of the person or of the .subj·ect matter generally, 
or a particular question attempted to he de·cided, or 
relief assumed to be given. New York Casualty Co. V'S. 
Lawson, 24 S. W. (2nd) 881. 
Mr. Freeman in his work on Judgments, Fourth 
Edition, 116, in speaking ·of void judgments says that 
they must he so for one or more of the £ollowing causes: 
one, want of juri.sdiction over the subject matter; two, 
want of jurisdiction over the parties, or s.ome of them; 
three, want of power to grant the relief contained in the 
judgment. Pitkin vs. Burnham, 87 N. W. 160; 55 L. R. A. 
280. 
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According to the order made by the coutt the city 
was to take water of Big rCottonwood Creek which· was 
now flowing .in the Big Cottonw·ood Tan:rier Ditch arid 
turn into the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch water suit-
able for irrigation in lieu and place of the Big Cotton-
wood Creek water so taken therefrom, and furnish culi-
nary water in pipes. I have been unable to find any law 
that would give the court authority to make ·such an 
order and without authority to make the order, it is void. 
AssrGN~IENT OF ERROR No. 18. 
The eourt erred in overruling defendant's ohje,ction 
to the following question put to the witness Moyle: ''Q. 
And did you use prior to July 23, 1926, did you use all 
of the water allotted to you under both sources of title¥" 
(Abs. 177) 
We think this ~called for the conclusion of the wit-
ness on one of the important material issues as to how 
much water he had been using and not to be concluded 
as a general statement of the witness tha:t he had used 
all of the water allotted to him under both sourees of 
title. vV e think the witness should have been required 
to state the use he had made of the water and let the 
~court ~conclude as to whether or not he had used all the 
water allotted to him and let the court conclude as to 
what water he was using, that is from what s·our~ce of 
title. 
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AssiGNMENT OF E·RBOR No. 19. 
The court erred in taking jud~cial notice of the fact 
that the natural flow of Big Cottonwood Creek is suit-
able water for culinary purposes. (Abs. 177) We think 
this wa.s ·entirely erroneous on the part of the court and 
it was one of the material issues in the ~case as to the 
value of the water right in question for rental purposes. 
It is our position that the court cannot take judicial 
notice ~of contraversiona.l issues. The evidence in the 
·case offered on behalf of defendant by the witnesses 
Amber Knight and Lynn M. Thatcher is undisputed, that 
the Big Cottonwood Creek water is not suitable for culi-
nary purposes. 
In the case of State Ex Rel. Attorney General vs. 
Norcross, reported in 112 N. W. at page 40, on page 43 
of the opinion the Court had this to say: 
''The affirmative position that a .certain river 
is navigable may well be judicially noticed in 
many instances. That a river is no:t navigable 
may sometimes be the subje-c~t of judicial notice; 
but considering the various degrees of navigabil-
ity, and the various kinds of navigation, and the 
various appliances for the purpose of navigation, 
and the different conditions along different por-
tions of the same river, there mus·t still remain 
a large .class of cases in which to determine this 
question by judicial notice would deprive the party 
averring navigability or non-navigability, as the 
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foundation of his right, of the opportunity of trial 
and hearing.'' 
' In Varcoe vs. Lee, et al., 181 Pae. 223, quo·ting ~rom 
the opinion at page 227 : 
''The test, therefore, in any particular case 
where it is sought to avoid or e:x:cuse the· produc'" 
tion of evidence because the fact to be proven is 
one of general knowledge and notoriety,' is: (1) 
Is the fact one of ·common, everyday kno"'ledge 
in that jurisdiction, which everyone of average 
intelligence and knowledge of things a·bouf ·him 
can be presumed to know¥ and (2) is it certain 
and indisrputable¥ If it is, it is a proper ease for 
dispensing with evidence, for its production can-
not add or aid. On the other hand, we may iwell 
repeat, if there is any reasona hie question what-
ever as to either point, proof should be requi;red. '' 
AssiGNMENT OF ERROR No. 20. ( Abs. 177) 
The court erred in overruling defendant's objection 
to the following question put to the witness M·oyle, :.: 
' ' Q. And you know what the value of that 
water coming through the pi pes of Salt Lake City 
is in that vicinity¥ ' ' 
This error is self-evident. In what 1way can the is-
sues in the instant case be affected by the price Salt Lake 
City or anyone else .cha1rges for ·culinary water piped to 
a house w:hen the water right in ques1tion was a turn right 
for irrigation purposes¥ There is no relationship and 
one would have no hearing on the other. 
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AssiGNMENT oF EHROR No. 21. (.A~bs. 177) 
The court e1rred in overruling defendant's objection 
to the following question put to the witness Weiler: 
'
1
':Q. Now on the market value of the stock 
that you purchased, is that sto{~k more valuable 
for- the one-fifth in culinary water or the four-
fifths you got in irrigation water~" 
This is obviously erroneous. It could make no dif-
f~reric~'what the witness's opinion was, as to what part 
of the ·rights he received from the certifi-cate of stock 
made up the value to him, and a water right for culinary 
purposes through a pipeline and for water to irrigate 
has no relationship to the water rights in litigation in 
the; instant case. · 
AssiGNMENT OF ERROR No. 22. 
The court erred in sustain~ng the plaintiffs' objec-
tion to the following question put to the witness Moyle 
on cro·ss-examination. 
_ _ '' Q. . Would you say that $15.00 per share 
\ 'i p .. ~r ~year Was a. r.easonable value for water used 
. ; ; :.\ entirely: for irrigation water, irrigating trees. and 
,. S?~e,o~h,~r <~;rops~''. 
B~~r:i~g in ~ind.: that witness had been testifying p,p_on 
direct examination as to what he estimated the rental 
value of the 22. 3/4 share~ of water right which. he 
cl~:'~med, was worth, on ocoss examination by the ques-
tion asked it was dearly sought to test the knowledge 
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and competency of the witness and to ascertain w ha.t his 
value would be for the rental value of water used for 
irrigation water, irrigating trees and other crops such 
as the w~tness had testified that he used the water for, 
hut the court would not permit it. 
AssiGNMENT OF ERROR No. 23. 
The ·court erred in sustaining plaintiffs' objection to 
the following question put by the defendant to the wit-
ness Macdonald, who was the court's watermaster over 
all the waters of Big Cottonwood Canyon Creek. 
"·Q. 'y ere you ever served with any order 
from the court, telling you that Salt Lake City 
had ·eondemned part of the water rights in the Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch, and from then on not 
to deliver that water to the Big Cottonwood Tan-
ner Ditch?'' 
We think this is a proper question to have answered. It 
is our contention that the water could not be condemned 
and taken away from the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch 
without being approved by the State Engineer and by 
an order directing the court commis·sioner to recognize 
the change of the right to use and the place of use of the 
water of the Big Co.rttonwood Tanner Ditch. 
WHEREFORE, by reason of the manifest errors of the 
court assigned and relied on for a reversal by the ap-
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p.ellant, it hereby prays that the judgment by the lower 
cou~~ be reversed and for such other and further relief 
as to this ·court may seem. proper. 
• l ; ;' ~ ) 
'·',;' 
. -~ • j 
J ~ .l 1 I ' 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN' 
GERALD IRVINE' 
A. P. KESLER, 
Attorneys for AppeUant. 
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